Institutional dilemma in semi-presidentialism: The Mongolian case

This study examines the effect of semi-presidentialism on institutional dilemmas and instabilities in the Mongolian case. Semi-presidentialism creates different effects on the form of the state structure in the process of democratic transition and consolidation. In this context, the main argument is whether semi-presidentialism creates institutional stability and supports democracy by keeping institutional dilemmas as low as possible or, on the contrary, semi-presidentialism exacerbates institutional dilemmas, creating political instability and collapsing democracy. This system creates main four situations: cohabitation, a divided minority government, a divided government, and a unified majority government depending on the results of the presidential and parliamentary elections. Therefore, the main research question is defined that "What are the interrelationships of the main factors affecting institutional dilemmas in the semi-presidential system?". These situations affect institutional dilemmas between the president, parliament, and government institutions. Most of the post-communist countries that experienced a democratic transition since the 1990s chose a semi-presidential system including Mongolia. The study covers four situations of semi-presidentialism that occurred in Mongolia from 1992 to 2020. Overall, institutional dilemmas led to government instability but did not lead to the retreat or collapse of democracy. Key Words: Institutional Dilemma, Cohabitation, Divided Government, Divided Minority Government, Mongolia, Semi-presidentialism, and Unified Majority Government.