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This paper provides a dynamic model to study the evolution of trust and intrinsic preferences for reciprocity such as altruism, selfishness, and vulnerability-responsiveness in a game-theoretic framework. Trust reflects an agent's belief that other agents cooperate in a prisoner's dilemma game. Altruist agents cooperate without considering their opponents' actions, while selfish agents always defect. On the other hand, vulnerability-responsive agents care about not letting their opponents harm just because their opponents trusted them. From an initial distribution of interacting heterogeneous agents in terms of their personality characteristics, we analyze the evolution of these personality traits in the population when agents are randomly matched to play a sequential prisoners' dilemma game. First movers cooperate or defect depending on their trust value, while second movers choose a strategy depending on their reciprocal preferences. We use agent-based and replicator dynamics models to see the coevolution of trust and intrinsic preferences. Our results indicate that high trust creates a better environment for selfish agents, while low trust decreases their genetic fitness since their evolutionary advantage over other agents reduces. These results explain the coexistence of cooperative and non-cooperative types in the same population.