Logic: Martin Heidegger's question of truth

This thesis examines Martin Heidegger's Logic: The Question of Truth lectures delivered in 1925–1926, focusing on his critique of traditional logic and the reconceptualization of truth in phenomenological and ontological terms. By analyzing Heidegger's critical engagement with Edmund Husserl's idealist phenomenology, the study argues that Heidegger reorients the concept of logic from a formal-rational structure toward a temporal process of disclosure (aletheia). The thesis is structured through comparative analyses with three key thinkers: Husserl, in relation to phenomenological logic; Aristotle, in the interpretation of logos; and Kant, through the concepts of time and self-affection. It is asserted that Heidegger's notion of truth as disclosure fundamentally challenges the Platonic and Cartesian foundations of classical logic. The work ultimately demonstrates how Heidegger's rethinking of logic as an existential-ontological phenomenon leads to a radical reinterpretation of the relationship between logic, being, time, and language. Thus, this study not only offers a critical engagement with Heidegger's early philosophy but also contributes to a deeper understanding of the temporal foundations of his conception of truth.