Performans bağlamında kesin olmayan geri bildirimlerle bilgi değerleme ve işleme: Deneysel bulgular

This study explores (1) initial beliefs, (2) the processing of information, (3) the willingness to pay for information, where individuals receive noisy feedback about their own performance (a self-relevant case) as well as the performance of others (a self-irrelevant case) in an experimental task. The experiment constructs a setting where individuals have monetary incentives to hold accurate beliefs, but where the information received or purchased can also be relevant to self-image. In terms of beliefs, we find that although individuals are aware of overconfidence in others, they do not correct for this bias in their self-assessments, displaying significant overconfidence. Regarding information processing, there is evidence for conservatism and asymmetry in both contexts, with individuals being more responsive to positive information. Analyses on the demand for information reveal the existence of overbidding for information in both contexts. However, when individuals assess their own performance, they: (1) are more likely to interpret negative feedback in a self-serving way, (2) overvalue a further piece of information significantly more after receiving negative than positive feedback, potentially pointing to ego-related motives. Finally, we find some evidence supporting a decline in overbidding when information acquisition is delegated to disinterested parties.