Stoicism, passions and an ethical dilemma: Seneca, Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius

This study aims to analyze the Stoic philosophers Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius' approaches to passions. The introduction of the thesis explains the fundamental principles of Stoicism, which revolve around the concepts of nature, reason, and virtue, and emphasizes the positioning of passions as an ethical problem area. Subsequently, each philosopher's views on passions are examined in detail. The first chapter addresses Seneca's view of passions as "irrational and destructive forces," discussing his view that emotions such as anger, fear, and lust distance humans from virtue. Seneca's moral recommendations, which aim to free humans from the bondage of passions, are conveyed, but it is revealed that his strict approach ignores the emotional dimensions of human nature. The second chapter examines Epictetus' emphasis on willpower and individual responsibility in the face of passions. According to him, freedom is only possible through the effective use of reason and willpower to gain mastery over passions. However, it is argued that this approach to some extent excludes the biological and social functions of emotions. The third section evaluates Marcus Aurelius' more moderate and middle-of-the-road stance. Aurelius advised that passions should be disciplined under the guidance of reason rather than rejected entirely, thus attempting to interpret passions within a balance appropriate to nature. In this respect, his views are positioned within a framework closer to human nature than those of Seneca and Epictetus. In the conclusion of the thesis, the Stoic view, jointly defended by the three thinkers, that "passions are entirely harmful" is subjected to critical examination. The study is structured around two main objections: First, the definitional ambiguity of the distinction between "good emotion" and "bad passion." Since emotions mostly develop on a spectrum, it is impossible to determine precisely where the boundary between, for example, productive love and destructive passion begins and ends. Second, even passions deemed harmful can serve positive and meaningful functions in certain contexts. Based on these two lines of thought, the thesis argues that the Stoics' rigid approach of advocating the complete suppression of passions is incompatible with human nature. While the dangerous aspects of passions are not denied, it is argued that when they are measured and guided by reason, they perform indispensable functions in terms of both individual development and social progress. Therefore, the position defended by the thesis is not one that excludes passions, but rather a holistic approach that seeks to understand and transform them.