Value creation in U.S. bank mergers before and after the global financial crisis

This thesis examines short-term value creation of 214 mergers and acquisitions (M&As) that were announced between 2000 and 2014 in U.S. banking industry. In particular, the merger premiums before and after the Global Financial Crisis (2008-2009) are examined. We find that, on average, the target banks' cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are 23.64% while the bidders' CARs are -1.24% around the announcement date with a 3-day (+1,-1) event window over the sample period both being statistically significant. We also find statistically significant positive CARs of 2.42% for the combined entity of the bidder and target banks within the same event window. Our findings point out that M&As are value-creating events for the combined entity due to created synergies between bidders and targets; however, bidders may sometimes overpay to obtain these gains. The CARs for the M&As that cash is used as a medium of payment are found to be higher than stock only-financed acquisitions. Our findings reveal that M&As taking place before the Global Financial Crisis period (2000-20007) realize lower gains for targets, bidders and combined compared to those after the Global Financial Crisis periods (2010-2014) possibly due to stronger banks surviving after the crisis and more prudent and reliable market environment after the Dodd-Frank Act. For target and bidder banks, the CARs decrease as the relative size of the target to the bidder bank increase. Finally, we demonstrate that instate (focusing) mergers resulted in higher CARs than interstate (diversifying) mergers for the full sample period.