The stream of consciousness and the problem of selfhood in William James

This study examines William James's understanding of consciousness and self within a coherent philosophical framework. James's thought is shaped primarily around the notion of the "stream of consciousness." He characterizes consciousness not as a fragmented, static, or mechanical structure, but as a dynamic and continuous flow akin to a river. This approach provides a striking alternative to the classical conception of a "enduring self" and offers a novel perspective to contemporary debates on subjectivity and personal identity. The first chapter explores James's theory of consciousness by analyzing the indivisibility of consciousness, the continuity of subjective experience, and the fundamental elements of the stream. It then discusses James's attempt to account for continuity without positing a fixed subject through the notions of "transitive states" and the "fringe of consciousness." The chapter further examines his experiential monism and the doctrine of "pure experience" as a philosophical ground that transcends the subject–object dichotomy. The second chapter systematically analyzes James's conception of selfhood. Focusing on the distinction between the "I" (the knower) and the "Me" (the known), it explores the material, social, and spiritual dimensions of the self. It demonstrates that James conceives self not merely as an individual phenomenon of consciousness but also as a structure intertwined with social relations and value-orientations. The chapter also reveals the connection between James's pragmatism and his theory of self. The third chapter focuses on the problem of personal identity within the stream of consciousness. Although James rejects the assumption of a enduring self among constantly shifting conscious states, he attempts to explain the sense of identity through continuity and familiarity. Yet this approach does not ultimately account for how a person maintains identity over time. While recognizing the strengths of James's model, this study argues that the complete exclusion of an enduring subject leads to certain theoretical difficulties. Although James's conception of the stream of consciousness is undoubtedly groundbreaking in portraying consciousness as a dynamic and continuous process, his approach fails to escape three fundamental problems: (i) When the necessarily for-someone character of experience is neglected, the issue of the "disownership of experience" arises. (ii) Rejecting an enduring self undermines the notions of agency and responsibility upon which legal, moral, and social systems rest. (iii) Conceiving the phenomenal subject merely as a functional center emerging from successive experiences does not adequately explain the subject as a necessary condition of experience. These three points render James's view of consciousness and self both illuminating and controversial. While deepening our intuitions about the nature of consciousness, his philosophy intensifies rather than resolves the problem of subjectivity and identity, thereby sustaining a problem-space that remains vital in contemporary philosophical discussions.