An inquiry into the possibility of consciousness in the context of artificial intelligence

In recent years, philosophy of mind has increasingly focused on the relationship between human intelligence and artificial intelligence. The aim of this study is to investigate whether consciousness can be possible within artificial intelligence, based on the relationship between human and artificial intelligence. The study begins with an examination of the problem of other minds, discussing the difficulties of knowing another person's mental states. In this context, Thomas Nagel and Daniel Dennett emerge as prominent figures with their distinct perspectives. Nagel, with his famous argument What is it like to be a bat?, emphasizes the difficulty of grasping another being's experience and argues that subjectivity is at the core of consciousness. Dennett, on the other hand, proposes the method of hetero-phenomenology, claiming that it is possible to investigate the mental states of others through scientific observation. The problem of other minds raises fundamental questions such as Can another's mental states be directly perceived? or Can another being feel the way I do?, revealing the need for a comprehensive exploration of the elusive nature of consciousness. This establishes a strong connection between the problem of other minds and the problem of consciousness. In the second part of the study, the concept of consciousness is analyzed in detail by outlining the structure of the consciousness debate. The views of philosophers such as David Chalmers and Gilbert Ryle on how consciousness should be defined are explored. Furthermore, key concepts related to consciousness—such as subjectivity, qualia, and interiority—are thoroughly examined, especially through the ideas of John Searle. Thirdly, the study addresses the question of whether consciousness can be possible in artificial intelligence. The question Can a machine think? is discussed within the framework of philosophy of mind through two competing views: Weak AI and Strong AI. The concepts of mind, mental states, consciousness, and artificial intelligence are clarified and analyzed in detail. In this context, the syntactic and semantic features of the human brain, as well as the syntactic structure of artificial intelligence, are evaluated in relation to the topic. Additionally, Alan Turing's Turing Test and John Searle's Chinese Room argument, developed in opposition to it, are analyzed. This study consistently questions whether consciousness is truly possible in the context of artificial intelligence.