The Art of Making an International Nuclear Deal How the Internal and External Variables Constrained or Facilitated the International Negotiations: Case of Iran’s Nuclear Deal 2009-2015

From the starting point of Iran’s nuclear crisis in 2003 through 2005, the negotiations with Iran took place with France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (EU3) and starting from 2006, with the P5+1. The conflict was not resolved as a result of these negotiations. After President Obama took office in 2009, he initiated the strategy of engagement offering Iran the negotiations without preconditions. The result of these negotiations was the “Geneva Agreement”. However, the Iranians political and social massive backlash against the agreement prevented its ratification. The second round of negotiations led by Brazil and Turkey in 2010 produced the “Tehran Declaration”. However, this was a failure as well because it was rejected by the United States. Thereafter Obama continued imposing tough sanctions against Iran while Iran was continuing its nuclear program. After the election of President Rouhani in 2013, a new round of negotiations started. Eventually, in July 2015 the nuclear agreement between Iran and the P5+1, known as JCPOA put an end to approximately 12 years of tensions between the parties and an international crisis that literally was on the verge of war. This research aims to investigate the internal and external factors that constrained or facilitated the international negotiations regarding Iran’s nuclear issue. This study ascertains that domestic politics and public opinion can function as means of constraining or facilitating international agreements. Moreover, the study strives to clarify the impact of the external influential mechanisms, namely sanctions and persuasion, on reaching an international agreement with respect to Iran’s nuclear program. Keywords: Iran’s nuclear program, Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, Two-Level game, reverberation, public opinion, sanctions, persuasion