Evaluation of excessive data collection within the scope of abuse of dominant position

Competition law and personal data protection law are two separate fields. However, in recent years, technological advancement has led to the emergence of data-driven markets. Enterprises operating in data-driven markets generally do not charge users a monetary fee. In these markets, users' data hold significant importance, and this new business model has brought about unconventional competition law violations within the scope of traditional competition law. Accordingly, competition authorities conducted investigations to determine whether the protection of personal data constitutes a competition parameter. Recently, competition authorities have issued decisions indicating that the excessive data collection by digital platforms constitutes an abuse of dominance. In this study, the excessive data collection by digital platforms was examined in the context of the abuse of dominance. To do this, the economic characteristics of digital platforms that especially encourage concentration were considered, and the importance of "personal data" in the context of competition law and its specific function in digital markets was analysed. Subsequently, the classification of excessive data collection under the theories of harm related to the abuse of dominance was examined in light of similar judicial decisions. In the next section, the decisions of both German and Turkish competition authorities regarding Facebook's data processing policy and the points at which these decisions diverge were evaluated. Finally, the developments in the legislation of Germany, the European Union, and Turkey were compared, given the inability of the existing competition law to effectively respond to the rapidly evolving needs of digital markets. Keywords: Competition law, personal data protection law, personal data, digital markets, data-driven markets, digital markets act, gatekeepers.