A critique of instrumental rationality

Throughout the history of philosophy, scholars have defined human beings as creatures with reason. According to this, in addition to many of his qualities, man is a human being mainly because he has reason. On the other hand, it is not possible to talk about the dominance of a single understanding or the existence of a position regarding the nature of the mind to which such a role is assigned and how it realizes itself. As a matter of fact, these questions are answered from very different perspectives, both onto-logically and epistemologically. In our study, we discussed the process of the mind's autonomy. According to this, with the philosophy of linguistic turn, the mind evolves into a position that can rea-lize itself free from all bases. Although it is accepted as having an almost unlimited power in terms of epistemology, in the understandings before the linguistic turn, the mind always appears as an entity that needs separate foundations from itself. However, while the philosophy oflinguistic turn liberates the mind in this sense, it simultaneously allocates an object-forming power to it. The practical manifestation of this understanding, which we try to deal with through Frege and Russell, appears as instrumental rationality. This manifestation of the theoretical background in the practicle plane appears as instrumental rationality. The founding codes of instrumental rationality, which manifest themselves independently of all foundations, emerge as logical forms and mathematical models. As a result, an unbridgeable gap arises between instrumental rationality, which must be positioned within the narrowest possible limits, and life itself. In this respect, our study aims to address the constraints and dilemmas of simul-taneous instrumental rationality, while claiming that instrumental rationality is a practical manifestation of the philosophy of returning to language.