The problem of the ontological status of qualia in contemporary philosophy of mind

"The problem of the ontological status of qualia" can be defined as the problem of whether the subjective qualities of conscious experience, i.e. qualia, can be explained by way of biochemical/neurological/physical processes that take place in the brain and central nervous system. The problem of qualia, which constitutes the core of discussions held in the field of contemporary philosophy of mind, is an extent of two ancient problematics –materialism-dualism antilogy and mind-body problem– that appear in different forms within the period from Ancient Greek philosophy to our day. The first section of our work includes the definition and main properties of the concept qualia; its relation with consciousness and brain, the definition and scope of the problem of the ontological status of qualia. In the second and third sections, the process from soul to mind and from mind to consciousness in philosophy of mind are presented in company with main ontological approaches towards these concepts. In the fourth section, firstly the intellectual climate where contemporary philosophy of mind is cultivated is outlined. Then reductionism and anti-reductionism which are the two main ontological approaches to the problem of qualia are introduced with reference to its leading representatives. Lastly, the results we came through as a result of our research and a proposal of an ontological conception regarding the problem are presented.