The comparative analysis of Gallipoli Campaign and Battle of Normandy

Throughout the World military history the amphibious operations have always been one of the most difficult and challenging battles of all. Thus their success rate is always lower than the others. Without thorough preparation and detailed planning or when faced up a well organized defence many amphibious operations were ended up with failure.From this origin, this dissertation aims to examine whether the Allied forces used and utilized the military experiences of the Gallipoli Campaign as an unsuccessful operation (and if they did how much of it) to plan and organize the Normandy amphibious landing.Within this framework in the first and second chapters of the dissertation the Gallipoli Campaign and the Battle of Normandy were examined separately. The background political, economic and military reasons of both battles together with each campaign?s decision maker?s meetings, correspondence and agreements were taken into consideration.In the third chapter the similarities and the differences between these two military events were analysed. By using these points it was tried to draw conclusions about whether the lessons from the Gallipoli Campaign were influential in the planning and the application processes of the Battle of Normandy.In the conclusion the military and political attitudes of each operation?s belligerents were examined in terms of specific international relations theories (realism, liberalism, geopolitical theories and the game theory). Moreover depending on the findings of the third chapter how much of the lessons of the unsuccessful Gallipoli Campaign were utilized and how much of this were effective in the success of the Battle of Normandy were expressed.