Ruh ve beden ayrımı açısından İbn Sina ve Descartes'ta bilginin kesinliği

This work aims to study the question of the certainty of knowledge. To do this, the certainty of knowledge is studied from the point of view of the theory of the soul in Avicenna and Descartes. We believe that the certainty is only possible as long as there is a possibility of immediacy in the act of knowing. We defend the thesis that this immediate knowledge in Avicenna and Descartes is in the knowledge of the self, the intuition that I exist. The intuition of both philosophers' cogito is not a conclusion or reasoning but it is a kind of apperception, a kind of consciousness that makes possible self-reflection. This intuition exists for these philosophers as an immediacy that cannot be ignored or suspended and which does not enter within the area of judgment. This is a first certainty and is the basis of all thought. For Avicenna and Descartes, intuition that I exist: the only certainty: the knowledge of what one knows is what makes possible the certainty of knowledge. What can be drawn from our research is the distinction between the level of certainty and the level of judgment. We try to emphasize this distinction throughout all of our work. Starting from the cogito expressed by Avicenna and Descartes, we defend the idea that there are two levels of knowledge: a kind of knowledge that does not need judgment and a kind of knowing that only functions by judgments, i.e. by the synthesis.