The security strategies of armed groups in multipolar civil wars: The case of Libya from the offensive realist perspective

This study examines the conflicts and competitions between armed groups in failed states. The aim of the study is to reveal the causal mechanism explaining the competitions between armed groups and the general tendency in the strategic behavior of the actors. In this context, the study seeks to answer the following two questions: why do armed groups seek power and what strategies do they follow to achieve their goals? In order to answer these questions, it applies the logic of offensive realism, which was developed from the interaction between the great powers in the international system, explaining conflicts and competitions, to armed groups in failed states. Based on this approach, the study argues that the anarchic system in which armed groups interact pushes them to struggle for power and forces them to pursue offensive strategies. Developing four different hypotheses regarding this main argument and testing them on the Libyan example, the study offers a generalizable perspective on the behavior of armed groups and the causes of civil wars.