Aristoteles'te epistemenin temeli olarak tanım

This research would like to clarify the fact that, being an absolute knowledge, epistêmê bases itself on definitions, kathalou, which are for Aristotle, directly predicated of proper name. We pursue this aim by initially analyzing the logos which composes the epistêmê, and finding the onomata. Taking into account the beings signified by these onomata, the onomata obtained from the analysis of the logos, are classified as proper names that correspond to the first ousiai, and as kathalou, that correspond to the second ousiai. After having completed the analysis of the logos, we focus on the limitation that Aristotle imposes to the epistêmê, which will only designate the demonstration consisting of a chain of syllogisms going from necessary premises to necessary conclusions. Taking into serious consideration the rule "all dianoetic knowledge proceeds from a preexisting knowledge", we will ask: "How are the premises from which premises do demonstrations proceed generated?". We will show that these premises are produced by a kind of definition which does not contain "to be / not to be" (einai / mê einai), and which function as necessary and immediate principles. In order to complete our analysis, we propose an interpretation that suppresses the distinction between the notions of "definition" and of "term" by highlighting the fact that those definitions that do not contain "to be / not to be", and the terms, designate the same eidê, but do so for two different usages. Ultimately, this research aims to show that there is a necessary relationship between the analysis of the logos and of the epistêmê, and that this relationship is founded on the double notions of "definition / term".