An approach to the problem of description and interpretation correlation in natural science: Wittgenstein

This study aims to investigate the problem of objectivity in the natural sciences from the perspective of Wittgenstein's early philosophy. The problem of objectivity in the natural sciences is a problem that has been discussed from certain angles. In the context of this thesis, the problem, which is called the problem of demarcation in the philosophy of science and aims to draw a boundary between science and pseudo-science, is investigated through Wittgenstein's views on the philosophy of language and philosophy of science. However, the problem of objectivity in natural sciences has been evaluated through the concepts of description interpretation instead of science and pseudo-science. The reason for studying the problem of objectivity in the philosophy of science through Wittgenstein's early philosophy is to focus on the problem that Wittgenstein's philosophy poses in relation to the philosophy of science views of logical empiricists. Associating Wittgenstein's views on the philosophy of science with the views of logical empiricists on the philosophy of science makes it difficult to make a holistic evaluation of Wittgenstein's philosophy. Evaluating Wittgenstein's philosophy in relation to its connections with Heinrich Hertz and comparing these connections with the views of logical empiricists offers an opportunity to re-evaluate the problem of objecitivity. Fort his purpose, in the first section, the views of Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Rusell, who provide the sources of the method of analysis used by Wittgenstein in his early philosophy, are discussed and their influence on Wittgenstein's early philosophy is analyzed. In the second part, Wittgenstein's views on the relationship of representation bewteen language and the world through the Picture Theory of Meaning and Wittgenstein's approach to the philosophy of science are discussed. In particular, these are shaped by the basic concepts and reading methods of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. In the third section, the connection of Wittgenstein's philosophy of science with the logical empiricists and Hertz is analyzed. The transformation of Wittgenstein's theory of meaning into the principle of verifiability of the logical empiricists and the connetcions with the relation of representation in Hertz's philosophy are discussed. In the discussion and conclusion section, it is disscussed how a solution to the problem of the correlation of description and interpretation can be produced based on Wittgenstein's relations with logical empiricists and Hertz. In particular, it is analyzed that the evaluation of Wittgenstein's philosophy of science views through logical empiricists is an incomplate evaluation.