The appearance of the other in Emmanuel Levinas' philosophy

The concept of the self has a significant place in Levinas? philosophy. Basing on this concept, the primary focus of this thesis is to explain the problem of the other and the identity. In this respect, revealing the appearances of the other sets the objective and the scope of this thesis.As being different from Western Philosophy, in Levinas? philosophy the being is grounded on ethics rather than ontology. Hence, the fundamental relationship between the self and the other is also grounded on ethics. According to Levinas, the perspective of ontology identifies the self and the other. So, breaking the tradition is possible only in the language. Accordingly, the crucial theme of the Levinas? philosophy is the ethical language that presents itself in the ethical relationship with the other. Since the concept of responsibility is an essential theme in Levinas? ethics, this thesis also focuses on that concept. The relationship of responsibility between the self and the other is unconditional, infinite, and non-reciprocal. Finding the source of this relationship is not possible. This relationship has infinity in itself. Diachrony that breaks the identity of the self suggests the eternalization of responsibility. With the above considerations, this thesis features the differences between the self and the other, and aims to elucidate this difference.By a discussion of whether the responsibility of the self is grounded on free will or infinity, this thesis concludes that Levinas indeed shares the above mentioned identification tradition of the Western Philosophy, which he strongly opposed. This is because, the obligation of the other in the face of the impotence of the self, eliminates the freedom of the other and compels the responsibility towards the self. As a result, the differences of the other melt away in the self, and identified.