A comparison between Frege's Theory of Reference and Galanbavi's Theory of Dalâlat

In this study, we compared Friedrich Ludwig Gottlob Frege's (1848-1925) referential theory with İsmail Gelenbevi's (Gelenbeli İsmail) (1730/31-1790/91) al-dalâlah (signification) theory. By comparison here we do not mean to appraise the views of one of the two logicians over the other; The aim is to determine the different, similar and same aspects of one view compared to the other in order to clarify the academic and philosophical knowledge we have covered. Thus, we thought that the academic-philosophical knowledge in question could have been revealed in a more pure way. Frege's identity theory, again, led to the emergence of his own understanding of referent. He took for himself the question of identity of expressions. While his view on identity has evolved and transformed, and this transformation has caused the concepts of "reference" and "sensation" to be interpreted mutually, we cannot directly speak of Gelenbevi's view on the identity of expressions. However, when the indication of the meaning of the word is realized through agreement (full overlap), according to him, due to his essentialist approach, indication makes both expressions equal. According to Frege, when words are used in the usual way, what one wants to say is their referent. According to Gelenbevi, signification is the presence of something in such a state that understanding that thing enables (creates) the understanding of something else. While Frege's definition is only evaluated within the philosophy of language, Gelenbevi's definition can be evaluated within both epistemeology and philosophy of language.