Peer disagreement and belief in god

Peer disagreement, as a subdiscipline of epistemology, is started to get attention especially in the last few years. When it occurs in between epistemically uneven persons, disagreement is not surprising, since agreement is not expected anyway. However, disagreement between peers has a surprising impact, since sometimes we find it hard to accept that some people think different than us. We may even suspect ourselves. Like this, the main problem of the peer disagreement is to figure out how should one respond to disagreement if peerness is on the table, inquiring which position is justified. In this thesis, where different approaches and their consequences are evaluated, it has been discussed that whether a peer disagreement is possible or not about belief in God. If it is possible, then what would be the solution? My point is, although there are many difficulties, peer disagreement on belief in God is possible. However, on the contrary of conciliatory view defenders, who are defending we are supposed revise or suspend our belief in the face of peer disagreement, I claim that by depending on individuality of personal responsibility keeping belief in God is justified. While doing this, like many other philosophical texts I have not used any quantitive method. All examples are solely thought experiments. In the thesis, concepts and claims have been evaluated through philosophical analysis and offered new solutions.