Indo-Israeli nuclear posture against Pakistan: A case of deterrence instability

Department: Middle Eastern Studies Republic of India and Israel share their protracted ideological and military antagonism with Pakistan. This study follows critical approach with qualitative method of research for finding the answer of the question "how does Indo-Israeli defense partnership pose asymmetric credible threat to Pakistan for nuclear deterrence instability in South Asia?" by reviewing and analyzing the relevant primary and secondary sources of information (books, journal and newspaper articles, reports, and other published material by experts, scholars and stakeholders). Researcher took benefit from the assumptions of Perfect Deterrence Theory (theorized by Frank C. Zagare and D. Marc Kilgour) about rational decision making, threat capability, threat credibility, status quo and deterrence stability for recognizing conventional and nuclear weapons posture of these countries. This limited academic exercise found that not only existing Indo-Israeli defense partnership directly poses asymmetric credible threat to Pakistan for nuclear deterrence instability in South Asia, but both countries share a history of sharing intelligence and secret arms supply during Indo-Pakistan wars (1965, 1971 and 1999). Further, both countries planned for joint air strikes on nuclear installations of Pakistan in 1979, 1982, 1984, 1986-1987, 1999 and 2003, but the credible retaliatory threat thwarted their plans before execution. Furthermore, Israel neither hesitates while transferring defense technology to India nor prohibits it to use against Pakistan. In Indo-Israeli defense partnership, India mostly remains at receiving end. It has deployed Israel-made air to surface bombs; anti-tank guided missiles; air and ballistic missile defense systems; UAVs and armed drones; early warning systems and intelligence gathering technologies; and spying satellites against Pakistan. Furthermore, India and Israel share relatively common political, diplomatic and military discourse about Pakistan and the issue of Jammu & Kashmir. Moreover, Indo-Israeli defense partnership causes asymmetric relationship with Pakistan and Indian Cold Start Doctrine further increases this asymmetry in both conventional and nuclear weapons domains. Subsequently, Pakistan has to add its nuclear option as a deterrent with ambiguous First Use posture like Israel. Despite declaring No First Use posture, the readiness of Indian conventional and nuclear forces shows its configuration with First Use posture. Resultantly, nuclear deterrence stability is at risk in South Asia. It is significant that India shows its rivalry with Pakistan openly, but Israel and Pakistan mostly ignore to talk about severe antagonism between each other overtly, instead in a euphemistic manner, but they regularly count each other's defense capabilities in their security calculus.