The origin of judgments in Kant and Frege

The question of how our general knowledge about objects and things is possible is perhaps the most fundamental discussion of the History of Philosophy. The final ground of this discussion is based on the judgments we make on objects and the judgments we ascribe objects. The main research subject of this study is to give an explanation of the grounding of these judgments by Kant and Frege. Kant, one of the important names of the Age of Enlightenment, explains this grounding with a synthesis activity based on the original unity of full perception. On the other hand, Frege, the founding name of modern symbolic logic, propound this grounding with a project of returning to language. The primary aim of this study is to identify the main differences in the judgment grounds of these two philosophers. In this direction, the main claim presented in the study is that Frege's project of returning to language, which he put forward as a critique of Kantian justification, lacks philosophical depth. Frege's lack of this depth causes great deficiencies in both the grounding of the objects of arithmetic and the semantic tradition in the following periods.