Kant'ın refleksiyon kavramlarinin amfibolisi ve analitiklik

This thesis is a research on the function of transcendental reflection in Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. The Ancient Greek origin of the word amphiboly and Aristotle's concept of amphiboly in the Sophistical Refutations are studied to explain the amphiboly of the concepts of reflection. Grelling-Nelson paradox and another paradox which may arise by the application of this paradox on the term amphiboly is discussed. Based on the fact that some concepts of reflection, primarily identity and difference, are used by Kant in defining analytic judgments and synthetic judgments, it is argued that the act of transcendental reflection is a necessary condition of the distinction between them. To this end, Kant's definition of analyticity is examined and Robert Hanna's theses on the subject are discussed. K-contradiction and m-contradiction are explained. The identity and difference of concepts are studied with regard to analyticity. The classification of representations which Kant presents in the Critique is compared with the degrees of knowledge which he indicates in the Jasche Logic. Upon citing Kant's criticism of the principle of the identity of indiscernibles of Leibniz, the function of transcendental reflection therein is indicated. Lastly, by defending that the nihil negativum in the table of nothings provided by Kant is not only a logical contradiction, insynthesizable concepts and Kant's definition of contradiction are explained. It is proposed that insynthesizable concepts can lead to judgments which are both tautological and contradictory.