An analyti̇cal evaluati̇on of al-Māturīdī's evi̇dences for the necessi̇ty of prophethood and hi̇s refutati̇on of its deni̇al

This study examines the concept of prophethood (nubuwwa) in the thought of Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī, focusing on his critique of anti-prophetic views and his rational arguments for the necessity of revelation. In Islamic theology (kalām), prophethood is not only a matter of belief but also a central axis for discussions concerning epistemology, morality, and social order. In this framework, prophets are not merely conveyors of divine knowledge; they are also the supporters of reason, the founders of justice, and the moral guides of humanity. Al-Māturīdī (d. 944) approaches this theme in a particularly structured and systematic way. In his major theological work Kitāb al-Tawḥīd, he first classifies those who deny prophethood into four main categories and refutes each with rational and theological arguments. He then proceeds to provide ten positive rational proofs for the necessity of prophethood. This dual methodology—first rejecting counter-claims, then offering affirmative justifications—demonstrates al-Māturīdī's deep commitment to the integrity of reason and revelation. According to al-Māturīdī, those who deny prophethood fall into four groups: (1) Those who reject the existence of a Creator and thus the possibility of any divine message, (2) Those who deny moral obligation, divine command, or eschatological reward and punishment, (3) Those who claim that reason alone suffices without the need for revelation, and (4) Those who interpret miracles as mere illusions, magic, or natural phenomena. Al-Māturīdī refutes these positions by emphasizing the cognitive limits of human reason, the metaphysical and social need for divine guidance, and the rational coherence of prophetic miracles. He then offers ten rational justifications for the necessity of prophets, including: 1. The human need for instructors in worldly affairs implies the necessity of divine guides in religious matters. 2. Social experience and custom show that people seek trustworthy leaders in complex matters. 3. Gratitude for divine blessings requires correct expression, which only revelation can instruct. 4. Justice and social order depend on a higher moral authority rooted in revelation. 5. Human reason is often compromised by passion and desire, which necessitates divine correction. 6. Reason cannot fully grasp the possible and contingent aspects of existence—only prophets can clarify them. 7. Even if reason were sufficient, divine generosity (faḍl) justifies the sending of prophets. 8. Prophets support and strengthen reason, guiding it in the face of competing impulses. 9. Sensory human nature struggles with unseen truths; the prophetic example makes them concrete. 10. Denial of prophethood lacks definitive rational proof—no conclusive counterargument has ever been established. The study ultimately reveals that al-Māturīdī's conception of prophethood is not limited to spiritual guidance alone; it encompasses the rational, moral, and socio-political dimensions of human life. He does not view revelation and reason as contradictory, but rather as complementary. Prophets, in his view, complete the function of reason and direct it toward truth in a world full of ambiguity and conflict. In conclusion, this thesis not only sheds light on al-Māturīdī's unique place in the classical kalām tradition but also repositions his theory of prophethood as a resource for engaging contemporary theological and philosophical debates regarding revelation, authority, and rationality.