N-person games

This work is an overview on n-person cooperative games and their solution concept in Game Theory, the mathematical theory of interactive decision situations characterized by a group of agents, each of whom has to make a decision based on their own preferences on the set of outcomes. In this study, the games are examined in two headings: N-person non-cooperation games and N-personal cooperation games. Cooperative games are divided into two groups as transferable utility games and non-transferable utility games. In transferable utility games, all cooperation, such as correlated strategies and side payments, is permitted. These are not permitted in non-transferable utility games. The problem of bargaining in non-transferable utility games has been discussed and this problem has been examined through two solution concepts, namely the Nash solution and the Kalai-Smorodinsky (KS) solution, depending on whether the game is symmetrical or asymmetrical. Transferable utility games have several solution concepts, the main of which is the core, but most of the time the core is empty. When we seek allocations that players can negotiate with each other, threaten each other or leave them as less dissatisfied as possible, different concepts of solution emerge. These are stablet sets, nucleolus, kernel which focuses on stability and Shapley value which is designed to ensure a fair distribution. The airport problem, the voting game and the bankruptcy problem have been studied as applications related to the subject.