Friedrich Nietzsche ve Max Scheler'e göre değerlerin kökeninde hınç mefhumu

In this thesis, we shall consider the genesis of values and especially from the points of view of Nietzsche and Scheler. Indeed, it is a basic philosophical reflection that can cause a variety of other considerations in political philosophy, in psychanalysis, history, sociology. On this other hand, in the era of globalization, intercultural exchanges facilitated by social networks, the world of show business, it seems important to ask, as Nietzsche makes the point in the first treaty of On the Genealogy of Morality, what are the origins of the values and / or how there are conveyed in history, who made them? Who decided? So that today we can claim to be carrying or not such values, be subject to such corporation, such ethics. In short, there is always a current philosophical reflection, subject to changes, extrapolated to different levels. So here, we take as support work, thoughts of Nietzsche and Scheler: the first one encouraging the prime idea of genesis of values based on an affect that is resentment. The second one repeats this thesis by developing, criticizing and providing a more objective, scientific, philosophical and positive approach. Thus in this thesis, our work will consist in the study of Groundwork of Metaphysics of Morals (1785), On The Genealogy of Morality (1887) of Friedrich Nietzsche and Ressentiment (1919) and Formalism in Ethic and non-formal Ethics of values (1913-1916) of Max Scheler. Before considering the thesis of Nietzsche, we shall see the moral thinking of Kant in Groundwork of Metaphysics of Morals, specially the main notions of good will and categorical imperative. We will bring out another school in moral, very different and formal. It will help us to understand better Nietzsche's and Scheler's thinkings. The genesis of values is expressed mainly in Nietzsche's work, on On the Genealogy of Morality. While philosophers like Kant favor a genesis after apriorism of the practical mind, Nietzsche offers a more empirical explanation, based on historical, sociological and especially psychological aspects. Indeed, Nietzsche is a thinker known for his profound knowledge of History (he speaks of "historical spirit") and his appeal to science such psychoanalysis. On the other hand, it gives a certain importance to the etymology, which in his view, is an area that would help to understand some terms. Indeed, he really made a linguistic work which constitutes a constructive argument for his thesis. He even said that the genesis of language itself is the work or the highest seigniorial levels. In fact, his thoughts turned more toward a consideration of the facts and not an induction. He denounced the "essentially unhistorical reflection" on the values of thinkers, especially English. Nietzsche considers as essential a reading of history to reach a non-utilitarian explanation that seems obvious to these English thinkers,or even a passive acceptance of these values through some "custom" or "habit" without questioning the real appreciation that we could do. The sense of distance can be detached from the utility and thus create the values as they are. Nietzsche advocates the definition of good and bad as a result bad through, first of all, an etymological consideration. On the other hand, he also considers that it is the feudal law which gave names. Good does not mean "unselfish", selfless, this notion of selfish has no connection with the aristocratic judgments but with those of the people (herd instinct) In the first part of On the Genealogy of Morality, Nietzsche tries to identify the causes of the origin of morality, specifically core values which are the concepts of good and bad. Basic values indeed, because they suggest the earliest forms of articulated values accepted by men. The German thinker criticizes the priestly function which introduces the concepts of pure and impure. This is not the true essence of the genesis of values, but rather an element biasing the latter. Priestly aristocracies lifestyles are staying away from the action, which leads to rumination and that's why it is noxious: they are trying to advocate those coming from inaction, and in fact are not spontaneous but calculated. It is a kind of neurasthenia that afflicts the priest of all times. Indeed, as he says they are "therapeutic nonsense invented by the priest." The various forms of abstinence (food, sex, asceticism) help develop affects of weak and frustrated people and so attitudes which are far from spontaneity and noble heart. The priests are supposed to be hostile to senses, implying hostility to the real world because, as Nietzsche and Scheler say, it is through the senses and perceptions that we create a link the world. It would therefore be a rejection of the real world of pleasure or pain, finally the real life. However, according to Nietzsche, it is thanks to the priestly existence that man could become interesting, actually, everything becomes more dangerous with the acquisition of "depth and malice", it sounds like a sarcastic and ironic note, but also a reality that contributes to his thesis. The opposition between the aristocratic knights and the priests, the force against impotence, this is almost Freudian, to the more cerebral. In history, the most intelligent were the priests, and it also expressed a somewhat anthropological historiography of the development of human intelligence. The situation of dominant/ dominated would be reversed through the subtle and brilliant strategy of reversing of values. Our current values are based in reality on "an act of supremely cerebral revenge". As a cause, hatred of impotence helped cause the insurrection of slaves and the establishment of their values. This reversal is not obvious because it took 2000 years to build, too large a scale to be expressed in an obvious way. It is the "universal mission" of the Jewish people according to Nietzsche to overcome the moral of the vile man. For Nietzsche, the fundamental difference between the nobles and the priests is the fact that their values arise from spontaneity and self-affirmation, only from oneself, while the values of ordinary men come from all they may feel towards something outside, nothing emerges frankly from them, but there is a dependence on the outside world, which makes a random and subjective assessment, depending on an affect Nietzsche does not question, unlike the Kantian school, the essential character of affect in the development of values when he speaks of "nobility of soul" and "spontaneity". Only in the latter, he seems to indicate stable and fair aspect, not to be found in the slave morality. At the beginning, there is no symbolism: it is rude and vulgar. In Ressentiment, resentment structure is observable through the experience of different "ideal" resentment relationships (husband/ wife, brother/ sister, stepmother/ stepdaughter) but also to oneself. One should pay attention not to seize the values in the relationships (the case of the average man). Indeed, in the book, one might tend to think that the only way to understand resentment is the relationship. What we shall see less in the Formalism in ethics. One way wonder if there is need for an "apriortical" approach as did Kant with his categorical imperative. But in the On The Genealogy of Morality, there is only a historical and sociological development of resentment. However, we note that the definition of resentment is relative by default against other feelings such as jealousy, envy, desire for revenge. The key elements in the definition of resentment (impotence, fatality, self- poisoning, self -enrichment) there is no way to ac, it is the result of a non-completion of other feelings, the object of resentment quickly becomes hazy and undefined. The man of resentment is always critical but never constructive (tries to avoid it) and quickly vindictive. There is a systematic repression, some impotence (which does not mean a lack of combat), not in action, but the re-action. However, we note that the definition of resentment is relative and by in Ressentiment by Scheler against other feelings such as jealousy, envy or desire for revenge. There is some mobility of resentment because of forgetfulness and difficulty to reveal this state to one self, there is an affection to an unidentified object, and the easy transition from one object to another. Thus, one may wonder if there is not a possible postponement of resentment on an external object instead of resentment facing one's own impotence? According to the difficulty to reveal it to oneself, which finally transfers to a misty object. Structurally, resentment obviously has its roots in psychology, psychoanalysis, but denotes a relation of representation and not reality, hence the importance given to the symbolism. Hence the question that can legitimately be asked: can everyone feel resentment? If so, will he/she necessarily be lead to the transmutation of his/her set of values? Can we escape the resentment? Can we realize this and get away? About the phenomenology of resentment Scheler speaks of an almost unconscious aspect of this feeling, which is eventually fed and to which you get used. Is there a certain acceptance until finally be installed in this feeling and used to it? But one must also pay attention to the difference between the definition that tries to make and fill Scheler against Nietzsche, and description. (this is essentially made by Nietzsche in On The Genealogy of Morality). In this work, it seems that we cannot escape from the understanding through the feeling of concepts: the use of examples (and thus of the affect) give the best possible way to understand the notion of resentment, starting from an "empathy." The values are visible through the affect so we return to the formalism of Scheler. In this study too, the place of religion in resentment is central: in fact is it the expression of the latter or otherwise a way to turn away? Nietzsche is disgusted and tries by all means to discredit the religious while Scheler regards it as vital and rescuer. This is why, in our societies moreover, considerating the religious and the dogmas under the philosophy of values is really necessary, because affect is more visible as some reactions (see Nietzsche and Scheler) of anger, susceptibility towards various facts or papers. The importance of the refusal to see reality, truth and thus creating an "alternative" values to which we are attached and in which we believe: the belief in an injustice, or in a further reward (Christianity or heaven), we look multiples excuses. This work is all the more subtle that it is not a matter of perversion of the meaning of values or desires but a perfect illusion for those who live resentment, as if it was a "mistake" in the destiny. It denotes an almost "pathotological" involuntary appareance. This almost pathological aspect is such that it can lead to consider as an essence. So we destroy the object which creates resentment and create a total illusion over it. Therefore, any judgment or assessment is issued in a "natural" way for them, while it is based on an illusion or even a masquerade. We notice the double sensation caused by the resentment that remains in the realm of pretty extreme emotions. Indeed, in the transgression of values, there is the feeling of freedom in a relatively rebellious character, jubilation resulting from this, some enthusiasm, but at the same time, there is an ambivalence because it also causes anxiety and depression due the fact that we can admit that is deviant and illusory. According to the above considerations, the hierarchy of values can be turned upside down because of this illusion. The world does not change, but resentment makes values change and also their key principle (universality) but they are only relative. Thus, the subjectivity of values is a major problem of this study because of the central position of resentment if it is considered as a source of morality and values. This engages a transmutation of values and thus poses a real question that goes beyond philosophy. In Nietzsche as in Scheler, a criticism of altruism, humanitarianism and utilitarianism is to be found. In both, these notions are commonly qualified as "good" for "reasons", they are explainable and thus non spontaneous, and they seem to relate more to the illusion mentioned above, such an illusion to « make the good », to « be good » but this is not spontaneous but thoughtful, calculated. Everything deplored by the two philosophers. Before delving into the question of the origin and structure of resentment, we can already think so trivial that of love and / or lack of love as a cause of resentment for Scheler, against modern morality and distrust to others. However, if Christian love has a negative influence for Nietzsche, it is beneficial in the thought of the value in Scheler. The same is true of the ascetic ideal, a real catastrophe for Nietzsche as a source of frustration, while Scheler considers that to be necessary in the purification of the individual and the spontaneity of its actions. Scheler therefore takes on Nietzsche's thesis regarding resentment as source of the genesis of values. Scheler is based more on the phenomenology of resentment, but rather at the individual level than at the collective level in Ressentiment. He examines in particular its forms and structure in the Formalism in ethics and non-formal ethics of values while Nietzsche was never interested, he merely establishes that affect as a source, without expressing what it is own origin, individual or collective. He is confined in etymological and socio-historical justifications, which includes some degree of subjectivity as his words are sometimes heavy and as he charges the Jewish people without trying to find a justification for this ancient resentment which therefore could lead to a more objective study of the genesis of values. We feel in this first treaty an almost paradoxical situation of hatred towards this vile people of priests, which commits us to a question: what is the real position of the philosopher who regrets objectivity and universality, without seeming perfectly impartial in its exposure of facts? This is a good question about his thesis itself. Perhaps it may confirm or refute this thesis anyway? First, the study of resentment at the individual level makes it more noticeable and more understandable. In fact, through numerous examples of possible resentments, the reader is led to ask questions and to question himself. Like Nietzsche, Scheler believes that thus affect influences that judgments and consequently our values. He also sees this part of subjectivity that must be overcome, while Nietzsche does not engage himself, just mentioning it. To give back this worthy field of study to philosophy as an objective reflection on values and not just as a psychological and psychoanalytical study, Scheler will establish the origin and the structure of this resentment and more widely of the morality and of the ethics in the Formalism in ethics. So he pours throughout his work the various forms of resentment, its causes, which feeds it, the distinctions and amalgams not to do like jealousy, envy, revenge. Later he briefly expresses the potential extrapolation of his theory at a collective and societal level, so we would question about the identity groups, which is a linkage to the nietzschean thought. Scheler's work, particularly in the Formalism in ethics, tries to find an objective explanation of the causes and to find philosophical ethics in a scientific and positive way. To do so, the philosopher uses neologisms, he will try to build a hierarchy of values according to their content, which is called material ethics. It is therefore relevant to the content of values, not just their form. Thus, Scheler will distinguish different values supports. Indeed, it is necessary to distinguish between the value and its support because the value does not mean what is referred to but the support. And it can be of different types. First, it can be a "thing", a "good" or finally a "res". The thing is a potential carrier of value but has no value in itself. The "res" means the thing of price, in other words a useful object. Finally, the good is the thing of value, in fact thus time the value determines its status of "good", its value represents the essence of that object. Thus, Scheler can therefore establish a hierarchy of objects, and hence a hierarchy of values. The philosopher distinguishes value in relation to different goofs, for that, he sets the imput values and how it allows a relative hierarchy. Emotional perception is what allows this input of a value? The criterion is love and hatred, and the ranking is based on this imput. But still, Scheler discusses the positive of negative character of the value. For this, he refers to the works of Franz Brentano regarding the superiority of not of the value. He then highlights the fact that existing is a positive state while non-existing is a negative state. On the other hand, always part of this input value, Scheler makes the difference between preference and choice. Indeed, the choice is about acts but the preference for a value allows us to say if it is superior or not. Thus the hierarchy of values is relative. Different criterias follow influencing preference, or vice versa subordination. Therefore, he distinguishes durability, divisibility, basing a value upon another, the depth of satisfaction and finally the relativity of the value. These criteria gradually help to determine the hierarchy of values. So Scheler can establish a second form of hierarchy of values, arising from the first on, described as more "formal". This time, Scheler will release eight relationships between levels-of-value and pure supports of values. This involves distinguishing values-of person directly affecting the person itself, and "real" values. Throughout the hierarchy made up of increasingly sacred values, Scheler considers a stratum with individual values and collective values (and in fact the values of society, not to be confused). With other values expressed in different social classes and their own relative level and, through the determination of the vital values as the noble and the common then the gooog and the bad, the superiority of one value to another, one can rank the thesis and arguments of Nietzsche and thus generate more scientific and sustained reflection. In fact, all the words of Nietzsche that we could call 'socio-historical" lacked strong arguments, now with the schelerian support they can be justified (or not) but in any case, be considered more objectively. Thus, the transmutation of values based on affect what is resentment, the morality of lords replaced by the morality of slaves, the "routing" of values from the individual to his community, the resentment of the invidual alone to his community, the position of individuals in Nietzsche confronted with values-of-person (including slaves), the own values opposed to the values of others in the birth of this resentment, the decreasing assessment of the values-of-acts (love, hate, knowledge), of the values- of-reaction allow to better understand Nietzsche containing the dominant/ dominated relationship, the frustrations of seconds. So, the structure of resentment, its evolution and its various expressions in history, its influence in the genesis of values are therefore explained and fits into a philosophical rigor. However, there still remains the question of religion as the ultimate values for Scheler are those who overlook all others, whereas for Nietzsche it is just a common way for the possibility of the transmutation of values. Hence a still limited reading though quite honest to study. To Nietzsche, religious values are opposed to vitalist values, for Scheler, they coexist in parallel. Furthermore, even the fact he is Christian, Scheler criticizes humanitarianism with quite elitist terms as Nietzsche did. So, finally, we can find between the two philosophers a common way of thinking.