Öğrencilerin eğitim harcamalarını sübvanse etmek pareto gelişim ve/veya refah arttırıcımıdır?

This paper analyzes a $3$ period OLG model under the DSGE framework in whichagents are heterogenous with respect to their ability and education level.Each young agent is assigned an ability level by nature randomly. Given thetuition determined by the government and bequest inherited from the parent,the young agent makes the choice of going to school or not. The consumptionand education expenditures of the young agents are financed by middle-agedagents who leave bequests to them. The middle-aged agents also pay somefraction of their total income in the form of social security which isdistributed to the current old agents. The redistribution rate is statecontingent and determined within the model. The endogenously determinedamount of bequest, uncertainty regarding the state of the economy andcollege completion, endogenous wage determination based upon the amount ofschooling are other key characteristics of the paper. The paper investigateswhether or not it is pareto optimal to subsidize students uniformly andconsiders both societal welfare and income inequality. It turns out that oneof the two stable equilibria is a poverty trap which can be caused by theperpetuity of path dependence of instituitons and subsidizing studentsuniformly increases social welfare and decreases income inequaliy.