Orta yolu çizmek: Ekonomik devlet idaresine orta güçlerin çeşitli tepki türleri

This thesis examines how middle powers navigate the rising use of economic statecraft in world politics. Departing from the existing literature that treats target states as either compliant or defiant, it asks: How do middle powers respond to external economic pressure? The dissertation develops a four-stage continuum of Accommodation, Engagement, Diversification, and Resistance, whose selection is shaped by material cost thresholds, domestic pay-offs, and institutional opportunities. After theorizing the causal logic of each pathway, the framework is tested through comparative empirical analyses that trace policy sequences in different regions and sectors. Building on typological theory-making, this study maps how different combinations of economic costs, domestic incentives, and coalition options drive middle-power responses to economic statecraft and includes a structured comparison that identify twelve observable outcomes that map how states recalibrate trade, investment, and diplomacy when coercion intensifies. The findings show that middle powers rarely face a simple binary choice: they blend and reorder the outcomes within four strategies as incentives, domestic coalitions, and market structures evolve. By bridging economic statecraft and middle power literatures, the thesis advances a much more refined understanding of power asymmetries and offers guidance for elucidating the designation of measured economic tools that anticipate adaptive agency.