Husserl'in mantık araştırmaları'nda idalite meselesi: Proto-transandantal bir okuma

Our work attempts to treat of the question of ideality as presented in Logical Investigations, particularly as the ideality of meaning, in the light of Husserl's later writings, in a retrospective manner. Far from reducing meaning to a psychic content that is associatively added to the word and endows it with meaning, as well as hypostasizing it as something that would come from another extra-mental realm to adhere to the word, Husserl considers meaning in its relation to the act of signifying and analyzes expressions as acts in which meanings are manifested as ideal units. This search for a third way beyond psychologism and semantic realism to account for the ideality of meaning can only be achieved within the framework of a transcendental philosophy. Thus, in the first part of our thesis, we try to show that the phenomenology of Logical Investigations can be considered as proto-transcendental phenomenology in its motivation, method and theme, and that the theory of meaning presented in this work confirms this proto-transcendental reading. In the second part of our work, we question, starting from the idea of the extension of the concept of meaning as sense to the whole sphere of consciousness, whether Husserl's first phenomenology really succeeds in assigning meaning the desired ontological status, and consequently, in establishing an original theory of meaning.