An attempt of a Kantian critique of Saul Kripke's scientific essentialism

In this thesis, though Kripke's view of the scientific essentialism is partially dealt from an empiricistic point of view, it is dealt with from Kantian perspective in general and is subject to criticism. Kripkeian scientific essentialism is based on re-advocating the theory of direct reference in the philosophy of language, which was first seen in Mill, in the context of modal logic, as a theory of transworld and rigid designation. In this work it has been argued that while Kripkean essentialism, which is different from Aristotle's form essentialism in terms of the outreach, but similar in terms of the outcome it reaches/defends, can be considered successful when the subject is human beings, however, it is problematic when the subjects are impersonal singulars and natural kinds. It has been argued that in contrast to Kant's claim that all necessary propositions are a priori, Kripke's claim that a posteriori propositions can also express necessity and thus the empirical sciences discover the essences of natural kinds in this way cannot be true. The mainstays of this attempt of a critique are the original meanings Kant brought to the concepts of object, causality, experience, representation and appearance within the scope of the transcendental idealism and the interpretation of possible worlds semantics according to these meanings.