Hard positivism, contemporary representatives, its criticisms

With regards to analytical jurisprudence, Hart-Dworkin debate has been an important turning point. Dworkin based the elements of natural law on the existence of moral principles in the judicial process as well as their influence on the interpretive activity and cast doubt on the legal positivism's theses. Hart, in response to Dworkin, stated that moral principles can be incorporated in law through the rule of recognition of the legal system and this fact does not contradict legal positivism's theses. Hart's positivist theory is soft in this respect; because even if the moral principles are not included in law by themselves, there is flexibility in the incorporation of morality in law if the law allows it. However, the hard positivist approach which started with Joseph Raz suggests that it is not conceptually possible for morality to have the features of law.In this respect, Raz's legal positivism is hard or exclusionary. Because it argues that moral principles that are not based on social facts can never be included in the conceptual domain of law. Following Raz; Andrei Marmor, Scott J. Shapiro and Brian Leiter also enriched this theory. This study aims to present the elements of hard positivist theory by taking into consideration the contemporary contributions as well as criticism and to reach conceptual, practical and ethical conclusions from them.