Three constituents of singularity in Heidegger: Anxiety, temporality and death

In this thesis, the main question is how Heidegger establishes singularity by virtue of the phenomenons of anxiety, temporality and death. At first, an overview of the main discussions about universal and individual is presented as a preparatory way towards singularity. The distinctive position of Heidegger's philosophy appears in his differentiation of Being from beings. While questioning Being as the ground of beings, Heidegger does not theorise it within the traditional concepts of universal or individual as his precedessors do. This study argues that Heidegger formulates a fundamental ontology in which a priviledged particular being, i.e. Dasein, is neither universal nor individual, rather a singular being that substitutes both of them along with the relation/distance between universal and individual as something enabling them. To formulate such fundamental ontology, Heidegger starts with individual experiences of Dasein, but he does not thematize it under any categories. Because Dasein has a constitution of disclosedness that makes it trancendent and singular, it can not be defined and determined with certain categories and universals like "rational animal" or "thinking thing". This thesis analyzes Dasein's such indeterminateness under the term of 'singularity' in the sense of uniqueness and attempts to comprehend it with concepts of anxiety, temporality and death as its three constituents. With phenomenological interpretations of these concepts, Heidegger designates anxiety as a primary affectivity of Dasein in which the boundaries of beings become indifferent and Being shows itself in a unique way. In view of the concept of transcendence, he also advances a new formulation of time, i.e. temporality, which is finite and depended on Dasein unlike calculable time in modernity. As the last constituent, death is held as a phenomenon of life by which Dasein attains both its singularity and wholeness.