Hegel felsefesinde gerçeklik kavramı ?realitat?dan ?wirklichkeit?a geçiş

In this work in question, the shift from Realität to Wirklichkeit in Hegelian philosophy is analyzed as aufhebung in a way to come up with the real Substance of the Geist. Realität being the realm of things and finitude at the level of `being? is that which corresponds to Nature. The supersession of the Nature represents its incorporation within the general Hegelian system as a realm having a lower degree of truth when compared to Wirklichkeit which represents the realm of intersubjectivity constituted by the dialectics of action. Therefore; Nature as the realm of the finite relations among things represents the Concept positing itself as immediacy. Affirming that immediacy is a term that is also interchangeably used by Hegel to define what is abstract, one-sided and simple, we will defend that the Nature is the immediate objectification of the Concept as finitude and contingency. However, only through the negation and preservation of this immediacy ?as the term aufhebung implies- it is possible to rise up to a higher truth. Therefore; the real substance of the Geist is not Realität defined as the realm of finite relations of things but Wirklichkeit, the realm of intersubjectivity created by the dialectics of action. As part of the dialectics of action which is equal to the dynamic movement of negativity, all the finite parts involved in the act such as the work achieved, the individuals as the perpetrators of the act in question with all their inclinations and motivations are superseded. As such; this passage represents a shift from the theory of things at the level of being to a theory of action. Throughout the thesis, we will illustrate different moments of the rigorous attempt to supersede the exteriorization of the Spirit in the form of being; that is, at the level of things. This attempt, however, will only be thoroughly achieved at the dialectics of action. The actions operating as negativity proves to be the real category uniting an-sich-sein and für-sich-sein of the Concept. It is also significant here to note that the real category; that which unites thought and being; is negativity itself which shows itself in the dialectics of the action. The common interest of many individuals, the common issues that which calls them to act, the heart of the matter (sache selbst) as Hegel calls it, is therefore the true Substance of the Spirit.The shift from Realität to Wirklichkeit will be discussed in the 5th Chapter of the Phenomenology of Spirit. The chapter called the Reason (Vernunft) is basically on the movement of consciousness training itself to rise up to the level of Reason from the level of understanding (Verstand). The understanding (Verstand) is representative thought indicating the thought of an other exterior to the Subject. Therefore; it stems from the insurmountable separation between the Subject and the Object. Taking Realität as the main realm in consideration imprisons us to representational thought. Thinking at the level of things almost already implies the trust upon some sort of immediacy. Grounding our conceptualizations on a given immediacy in turn masks the fact that immediacy is already posited by the Concept as its immediate objectification. Therefore; the chapter in question illustrates the moments of consciousness attempting to free itself from the level of things based on this trust upon immediacy.This chapter of the Phenomenology of Spirit is also significant in the sense that it refers to the moment of idealism. Superseding the division of the Subject andthe Object is indeed an idealistic question. In Hegelian philosophy, the Concept is the Subject that is identical to the Substance through its dialectical movement of auto-determination. The concept, in its immediate objectification, poses itself as immediacy, finitude, contingency in the realm of Realität which is alien to the Concept as its negation. Realität is therefore meant to be superseded as part of the auto-determination of the Concept.We will also refer to the Science of Logic in order to reinforce the argument. Indeed, the discussion on finitude and infinity in the first part of the work in question called ?Being? has great implications for our general purpose, since it indicates how the finite things are established as well as the possibility of their supersession. The distinction of Hegel between the limit (Grenze) and limitation (Schranke) will be, in this respect, instrumental throughout the work. The finite things for Hegel are determined in a way to limit each other; therefore one finite thing is limited by another finite thing ad infinitum. This determination constitutes the realm of finite things, Realität. However, this is not the sole determination. Each determinate quality has its own limitation which is not yet another thing but the possibility of its own supersession in relation to infinity. Therefore; from the very beginning qualities are constituted as finite things bearing the possibility of their supersession within themselves. All finite things are posited with the possibility of the supersession of their finitude. That?s the motor of the various degrees of reality in Hegelian philosophy. The supersession of Realität therefore has similar dynamics as the supersession of finite things. It is closely related to the supersession of finitude in favor of infinity.The objective of the thesis in question is to explicate the movement from Realität to Wirklichkeit as the dialectical supersession of the realm of things. In doing this, it is also aimed to underline that the Concept exteriorizes itself only immediately in the realm of things; Nature. The Concept sinks to the level of Being and thus loses its conceptual and qualitative characteristics in Nature. Therefore; the Concept cannot reside in the Nature. However, this is a necessary moment in the auto-determination of the concept. Only through the negation of this immediacy and finitude, the consciusness can rise to the level of Reason on one hand and the Concept can return to itself; related back to its own limitation and turns into Substance; which is the intersubjectivity created by the dialectics of the action. The ultimate objective is therefore to explicate the idealist attempt of Hegel to establish the identity between the Subject and the Substance.We have, in this respect, decided to achieve this objective inherent in Hegelian idealism from the point of view of the movement of consciousness that raises itself to the level of Reason (Vernunft). We believe the respective chapter of the Phenomenology of Spirit lies at the heart of the work with significant implications to Hegelian idealism. The relatively comprehensive exposition of the chapter seems to prove this. It is the chapter in which consciousness becomes the singular individual in relation to the objective world. The chapter reflects the tension of the individual consciousness in appropriating the objective world which is achieved at the end of the part on the observing reason. It is interesting to see, in this respect, that the preceding parts of the work in question including sense certainty, perception, understanding and self-consciousness are once more treated in the part called observing reason. It is as if the real experience of the consciousness commences only when the individuality is constituted once the self-consciousness has the certainty that it is all reality. With Fredrick Jameson , it seems plausible to defend that the previous chapters of the work in question are only isolated episodes of this and that part of the human experience having a significant place in the history of philosophy. Only when the self-consciousness questions outside reality and attains the certitude that there is nothing there to be found except itself, can we mention the experience of consciousness in its proper sense.However, tracing the identity of the Subject and the Substance which is ultimately a question related to the auto-determination of the Concept in the movement of the consciousness inevitably brings forth some methodological questions. It requires an approach to work with the different perspectives of Logic which is the exposition of the auto-determination of the Concept and the Phenomenology of Spirit which signifies the attempt of the consciousness to attain to that truth behind this auto-determination which constitutes the identity of the Subject and the Substance in general and the consciousness and its object specifically. We adopt the idea that both works are supplementary to each other. Phenomenology of Spirit will be the main resource of the thesis, while we are going to apply to the Logic when necessary.As to the organization of the thesis, the first chapter will deal with the introduction of the 5th chapter called the Certitude and Truth of Reason. Mainly, the problem of category is sketched in this part including the response of Hegel: auto-determination of the Concept in negativity. We will explain the moment in its relation to the preceding chapters of the work. We will also deal with the above-mentioned defects of the understanding. It will be stated that the reason, in this moment, has the certainty that it is all reality. However, it is yet only an assertion waiting to be fully actualized at end the moment of the reason once the action is comprehended as the real category between thought and being.The second chapter will be on the aforementioned discussions in the Science of Logic that deals with the determination of qualities as finite things; finitude and infinity. The dialectics at play in the constitution of finite things will also be at play in the dialectics that mark the shift from the realm of things to the realm of inter-subjectivity. In this part of the Logic of Being, Hegel proposes that qualities (determinate being) are determined both through other determination and self-determination. The first constitutes their relation to each other which constitutes their finitude while the other is their relation to infinity. Through their relation to infinity, they can be for-themselves. This process is defined by Hegel as the beginning of subjectivity. Therefore; the possibility of the supersession of finitude is present even at this relatively lower level of the dialectics.After seeing the dynamics behind the constitution of finite things in the second chapter, we turn to the Phenomenology of Spirit to see how perceptive consciousness whose object is the thing with various qualities conceptualises its objectification process. The objective here is to see that the perceptive consciousness is unable to establish the realm of things. Therefore; Realität cannot be determined properly by the perceptive consciousness which once more proves that it cannot be the real substance of the Spirit. This chapter of the Phenomenology of Spirit on Perception is indeed the first attempt of Spirit to become Substance. Therefore; the failure proposed here is of great importance for our theme in general. The chapter in general will be a critic against the reliance upon the immediacy of sense certainty which is in parallel to the separation between the perceptive consciousness and its object.The fourth chapter will be on the part of the 5th chapter of the Phenomenology of Spirit dealing with the movement of the observing reason. This part is especially important for the fact that it deals with the question of Nature. The observing reason attempting to find itself in the objective reality gradually becomes aware of the organic unity as its proper object. Grasping organic unity as a totality that preserves itself in the finite relations constituting itself, the observing reason attempts to have the truth behind the mechanical relations prevailing in this unity. Through idea of teleology, whose implications in the Science of Logic are also a part of the chapter, the observing reason cannot identify those mechanical relations with the teleological ones. However, this non-identity will prove that the conceptual and teleological relations are mainly qualitative and they lose themselves once they are translated into the quantitative ones in mechanical relations prevailing in the Nature. This will lead observing reason to return to itself in order to find the real substance of the Spirit.In the final chapter; the movement of the reason as self-consciousness will be traced until the moment when self-consciousness attains the truth behind the dialectics of action. The main theme is the attempt of reason as self-consciousness to efface all determinations of being which will only be possible through the dialectics of action. When action is comprehended as the true category, the determinations of being as the role of singular individuals and the work achieved are all cancelled out and the realm of collective concerns (sache selbst) ?the proper realm of inter-subjectivity- becomes the true Substance of the Spirit.The main result achieved as part of the research is that the supersession of the realm of things is intrinsic to the category problem; that is the unity between the consciousness and being. Such a unity can only be truly attained once the realm of being is dialectically superseded. We may propose that any kind of unity and identity in the Hegelian philosophy requires the work of negativity inherent in the dialectical movement. Therefore; the identity of being and consciousness already implies being to be superseded. The category problem is ultimately solved once it is posited as negativity. Only when the category is endowed with the dynamic character of the dialectics, can we mention the supersession of the realm of things. Through the operation of the category we can ultimately attain the real substance of the Spirit.