From Vienna to Zenta: Ottoman-Habsburg War in the context of Ottoman grand strategy (1683-1697)

The Hungarian front in the Great Turkish War of 1683-1699 is the main subject of this thesis. This thesis argues that the Ottomans acted within a specific strategy during the years of the Great Turkish Wars. This claim is supported by analyzing three different areas. In order to interpret the Ottoman grand strategy, the situation of the European states and their relations with the Ottomans are discussed first. Then, Ottoman domestic political issues that had a direct impact on the situation on the front line are analyzed. Finally, the developments on the Hungarian front against the Habsburgs are analyzed and the Ottoman strategies implemented as a result of these developments are interpreted. The Great Turkish War, which lasted fourteen years de facto and sixteen years officially, cannot be expected to be handled within a single process. Therefore, the thesis is divided into three main chapters due to the developments and individuals who directly affected the course of the war. The first part deals with the developments between the Ottoman defeat at Kahlenberg in 1683 and the fall of Belgrade in 1688. The efforts of the Ottomans to continue the war despite the defeats they suffered during this period are analyzed. Especially Yegen Osman Pasha's unsuccessful struggle against the Habsburgs as the serdar of Hungary changes the course of the war. The second part begins with the Habsburg invasion against the Ottoman lands of Rumelia as a result of Belgrade changing hands in 1688 and deals with the Ottoman counterattack after Fâzıl Mustafa Pasha's grand vizierate. At the same time, the developments in the Nine Years' War between the European states that started in 1688 are also included in this section. The second part ends at the beginning of 1692 with the Battle of Salankamen in 1691, in which the Ottomans were defeated. The third part covers the years 1692-1697. It examines the Ottoman strategy and campaigns, which were reshaped after Mustafa II became sultan. The chapter concludes with the Battle of Zenta in 1697, which effectively ended the war between the two sides and resulted in the Ottoman defeat. As a result of all these developments, one of the main arguments of the thesis is that there was a specific Ottoman strategy rather than an Ottoman retreat.