Dialetheic logic in Graham Priest and it's consequences on metaphysics of time

When we look at the history of philosophy, we see that the law of non-contradiction, as Aristotle puts, is recognized as the most basic principle of thought, or even of being and that it establishes the orthodoxy in this matter. Aristotle, considering the law of contradiction as the most basic principle of being, studies the existence of objects that are in a state of flux via making some distinctions like potentiality-activity and activity-actuality. Law of non-contradiction becomes the basic principle for the determination of objects. However, when time –especially the moment as a fraction of time– is considered according to this principle, there arise contradictions. It is confirmed that time cannot be explained conceptually within the scope of the law of contradiction. Paraconsistent logics –which are non-classical– that have arisen during the 20th century claim that the law of contradiction is not applicable to certain circumstances. The most radical paraconsistent logic is the dialetheic logic, which argues that some contradictions arising within the limits of thought are true and even real. Dialetheic logic, being introduced by Graham Priest and Richard Routley in the 1970s, proves to be academically efficient by its metaphysical implications within both at the level of logic and at the level of metaphysics. This thesis aims to understand whether time which cannot be conceptualized by the classical logic as it adheres to the law of contradiction can be explained conceptually within the limits of dialetheic logic or not. Firstly, with reference to the Aristotelian thought, we present the difficulties about time that are encountered in classical logic. Then we consider the question whether the dialethic logic is justified. Finally, we focus on the way the dialethic logic approaches the metaphysics of time. At the result of these analyses, we conclude that the dialethic logic embodies some important potentials, but it does not yet realize these potentials; and that the shift from dialethic logic to metaphysics is not sufficiently prepared by Priest and that this shift from dialethic logic to metaphysics requires a transcendental point of view.