The philosophical position of Kant between Neo-Kantians and Heidegger (Kantian Critique as prote metaphysica)

This study is based on a comparison of two interpretations which have been developed on Kant's philosophy. The first of these interpretations belongs to Heidegger and claims that Kant's philosophy is fundamentally an ontology, moreover a fundamental ontology based on the analysis of finite human whatness. He grounds this claim by arguing that Kantian criticism constitutes the subjectivity of the subject in a temporal context. Thus, the Kantian representation of the subjectivity of the subject emerges almost as an analytic of Dasein. The second interpretation belongs to the Marburg school of the Neo-Kantian tradition. According to this interpretation, Kant's philosophy is an epistemology of the mathematical natural sciences. In this context, the Kantian dichotomy of intuition and understanding must be modified in favor of understanding. Because Kant's philosophy contains the pure principles of natural sciences, and in this context, the function of understanding as a lawgiver of nature comes to the fore. Rather than the philosophical correctness of these two interpretations, our study focuses on the possibilities that allow these two opposite interpretations to emerge from Kant's philosophy. In this context, the thesis is that Kantian philosophy is neither an ontology nor an epistemology. Kantian critique is a primary metaphysics, a prote metaphysica, which itself enables a representation such as epistemology or ontology.