The parliament's tools for supervising the executive body after the 2017 Constitutional amendments
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Abstract (EN)
The thought of limiting the political power that has developed based on long historical experiences has become an indispensable principle of the liberal democratic order today. In order to respond to the search for limited power, the acts and actions carried out by the legislative and executive organs through the constitutional justice and administrative jurisdiction were subjected to judicial review. On the other hand, since the 20th century, the control of the executive body, which has been increasingly dominant in the political system, was not limited to judicial control, but parliaments, as a collective representative institution, also assumed important functions in the democratic political control of governments. The control of the legislative bodies also contributes to the development of a pluralistic democratic order, as parliaments host representatives of the opposition. The parliament can audit the executive body both through the monopoly of legislative making in general, the power of control over the government budget and the specialized commissions, and more specifically through the questions, general debate, parliamentary inquiry and investigation, which are the classical control tools it has. Thus, the legislative power ensures the accountability and transparency of the political power by both directly supervising the government and contributing to the formation of public opinion with the alternative sources of information it creates during the audit process. Thus, it also serves the purposes of limiting political power and preventing arbitrary behavior. This thesis examines the control mechanisms of the The Grand National Assembly of Turkey, which claims to meet such an important function, within the framework of the new legal platform and new government system that emerged after the 2017 Constitutional amendment. As a result of the study, the problems related to the efficiency of the audit tools of the GNAT were put forward due to their reasons and it was aimed to contribute to the development of the audit capacity of the Parliament by proposing solutions.
Author
Mert Hüseyin Akgün
How to Cite
Mert Hüseyin Akgün (Master Thesis). The parliament's tools for supervising the executive body after the 2017 Constitutional amendments, 2021, Hacettepe University.
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