A study of the relationship between essence and necessity in analytic metaphysics: The cases of Kripke and Fine

How essence, necessity and the nature of the relationship between them, should be understood, has been one of the central topics of philosophy since antiquity. This issue has also been debated for decades within contemporary analytic metaphysics. In this study, we discussed the opposing approaches of two prominent philosophers in analytic philosophy, Saul Kripke and Kit Fine, regarding this topic. In the first section, we examined how Kripke, by drawing on ideas such as possible worlds semantics, rigidity of names, necessity of true identity statements, and necessary a posteriori judgments, sought to reassert essentialism. In the second section, we analyzed Fine's critical approach, who argued against Kripke's prioritization of modality over essences. Fine contended that essences, expressed through real definitions, must be considered as prior to modality and that the identities of things should be regarded as the source of necessities.