Analyzing the actio libera in causa doctrine in theoretical, philosophical and applicable law perspective associated to criminal responsibility, culpability and voluntary action

"Actio Libera in Causa" constitutes a controversial issue in terms of criminal responsibility. The doctrine of "Actio Libera in Causa" arises as an analytical model that serves the purpose of attributing the culpability to the perpetrator and holding him responsible for his unlawful action, in cases where the cause of the perpetrator's unlawful action is his previous culpable action which had eliminated his culpability. Since ancient times, the principles of determining criminal responsibility have changed and developed. Modern criminal law accepts the choices and actions of the individual based on his/her free will as the basis of criminal responsibility. The culpability, which is a reflection of the existence of free will, can be defined basically as the power of discernment and the ability to control the actions of the self. In the event of a temporary impairment or loss of the culpability, the questions of whether and how perpetrator should be punished were discussed especially in context of the attribution of moral and religious responsibility in classical philosophy. Currently, these questions have also been discussed in the context of criminal law. The Actio Libera in Causa has been developed to answer these questions and has found widespread applicability. However, the theoretical explanation, philosophical reasoning and application of the Actio Libera in Causa pose important difficulties. The main purpose of this thesis is to explain these difficulties related to the Actio Libera in Causa and to seek solutions to these difficulties. In addition, in line with the developing technology and medicine, the situations that may be encountered in terms of criminal responsibility and temporary reasons will be envisaged and analyzed.