Executive compensation in joint stock company
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Abstract (EN)
In public joint stock companies, agency problems are frequently encountered between shareholders and managers, since managers have little or no share in the company. It was found that the salaries paid to board members and senior managers in these companies not only solve agency problems, but also aggravate them. Excessive increases in the amount of financial rights provided to partnership managers in recent years; harmed the interests of the partnership, shareholders and other interest groups. In order to curb these increases, a number of rules have been set by laws or corporate governance principles to disclosure executive compensation, associate it with performance and submit it to shareholders for approval. The aforementioned study deals with conflicts of interest at the heart of executive compensation and salary control.
Author
Osman Karaköse
How to Cite
Osman Karaköse (Doctorate thesis). Executive compensation in joint stock company, 2023, Galatasaray University.
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