Zarûriyyât-i Hamse in world legal systems from past to present

The basic purposes that Islamic law aims to realize (makâsıdü'ş-Şerîa) are divided into three as zûriyyât, hajiyyat and tahsîniyyât. The most important of these purposes, zûriyyât, consists of the security of life, property, generation, religion and mind, and that these five principles are protected not only in Islamic law but also in other nations and sharias, have been accepted by Islamic jurists since the 11th century. The basis of the proposition that these principles are protected in other societies is not a research, but the idea that a society that does not protect these principles cannot sustain its vitality. Our study aims to reveal whether these five principles are really protected in other legal systems. For this purpose, the contemporary legal systems of Socialist law, Continental European law and Anglo-Saxon law, as well as the ancient Mesopotamian, Hittite, Egyptian, Chinese, Indian, Hebrew, Iranian, Church, Roman and Turkish-Mongol laws that legal historians find worthy of examination, were examined. At the end of the research, it was seen that security of life and property is tried to be protected in all legal systems of the world despite some deficiencies. However, due to the inadequacy of the mechanisms to protect the individual against the state, security of life and security of property due to the freedom of interest have been frequently violated. While there are important regulations in historical legal systems regarding security of generation, it has been concluded that the measures to ensure security of generation in today's legal systems are inadequate. If we proceed from the possibility that the religion to be protected is the religion of Islam, it cannot be said that security of religion exists in any legal system. However, if we accept that what is meant by security of religion is freedom of religion and conscience with a different interpretation, it has been seen that this freedom is tried to be protected partially in historical legal systems and more intensively today. Security of mind understood within the framework of alcohol prohibition is also not present in any legal system. When the acceptance that life will face unbearable difficulties in the event of violation of necessities is evaluated together with the conclusion that there is no prohibition of alcohol in any legal system other than Islamic law, the possibility of reducing security of mind from the level of necessities to the level of necessities seems open to evaluation.