Avicenna's substance dualism and its dialogue with contemporary philosophy of mind

This dissertation re-evaluates Avicenna's account of the nafs-body relationship in light of modern critiques of Cartesian dualism. Rather than offering a purely historical comparison, the study seeks to answer the following question: Can an Avicennian framework propose a non-Cartesian alternative form of substance dualism that addresses contemporary debates such as mental causation, the pairing problem, and the unity of consciousness? This research adopts a comparative and conceptual approach located at the intersection of the history of philosophy and systematic analysis. It reconstructs Avicenna's ontology and psychology and compares them with Descartes's approach. Philosophical analysis is employed to clarify the necessary and sufficient conditions for key claims, while inference to the best explanation is used to assess which interpretation better accounts for phenomena such as self-awareness, intentionality, and personal identity. Case studies test Avicenna's model against canonical objections from the twentieth century. The study shows that Avicenna conceives of the nafs as an independent substance that coordinates bodily functions without being identical to them, resulting in a form of dualism grounded in metaphysical foundations that differ from Cartesian mechanism. His theory provides a basis for first-person awareness without appealing to an extended substance, distinguishes immaterial intellectual acts from sensory and bodily functions, and interprets nafs-body interaction not through the "ghost in the machine" model, but through metaphors of governance. When contemporary critiques are applied to this interpretation, it becomes evident that some objections primarily target Cartesian assumptions (e.g., mechanical interaction and spatial pairing) and therefore lose their force. In conclusion, the dissertation argues that Avicenna's psychology cannot be reduced to Aristotelian hylomorphism or Cartesian interactionism. Instead, it supports a non-Cartesian and defensible form of substance dualism that preserves the core intuitions of dualism. Thus, the thesis proposes Avicenna's framework as a legitimate and historically grounded alternative within contemporary philosophy of mind.