Spinoza'da Tanrı'nın özgürlüğü ve insanın özgürlüğü

In the last seven propositions of the fourth chapter of Ethics, Spinoza will introduce the free man to examine the true freedom of man. The free man expresses the highest power accessible to the active actions of the existing human being. Accordingly, the free man lives only under the guidance of reason and is only the efficient cause of his actions. This character of the free man has led to dissidence about the extent to which he is free. Indeed, some commentators have even found it contradictory on the grounds that it implies absolute freedom. The purpose of the thesis is to to interpret the relation of the free man to the freedom of God in a way that is compatible with both the propositions of the free man and the metaphysical, epistemological, and ethical doctrine of Spinoza and to demonstrate that the free man, as a finite modification of God, can only attain partial freedom. Furthermore, the concept of the free man itself indicates two distinct metaphysical realities: God and man. Therefore, while questioning the legitimacy of naming a human being as free who is determined to establish his relation to existence based on a measure, we will discuss whether the free man refers to an ideal model of human nature.