(Neo) populism in competitive authoritarian systems: The case of Hungary

This thesis aims to examine the close relationship between competitive authoritarian systems and neopopulism at theoretical and empirical levels. Competitive authoritarian systems are structures in which democratic mechanisms such as elections are formally maintained, while the independence of the media and the judiciary is limited, the area of movement of civil society is narrowed, and pluralism is systematically prevented. This situation brings with it a form of governance that is seemingly "competitive" but in reality "authoritarian". Neopopulism, on the other hand, stands out as a political strategy that aims to rapidly mobilize political support through the sharp boundaries drawn between the people and the elite as a response to the structural inequalities and crisis of representation created by the neoliberal order. This thesis examines the power of neopopulist leadership to transform political institutions and how competitive authoritarian practices can be made permanent through the example of Hungary. Constitutional changes, direct or indirect control of media outlets and restructuring of the electoral system in line with the interests of the ruling party have paved the way for the rapid institutionalization of authoritarian tendencies integrated with neopopulism. At the same time, it has been observed that populist discourses constructed on the axis of migration, identity and nationalism have also strengthened the mass support of the government. In this context, this thesis examines in detail how democratic norms are eroded in such systems, with which strategic alliances and lines of resistance the opposition can achieve success, and the vital role of civil society. This example shows that neopopulism does not only serve as a "corrective" function for the crisis of representation in democratic systems, but on the contrary, it can be an accelerating element that supports the continuity and reinforcement of authoritarian tendencies.