The semantics of singular propositions and its implications from the perspective of kalām

The problem of the existence of singular propositions, which are directly about an individual and include the individual as a component of the proposition, has been addressed in the metaphysics of modality with reference to numerous views. In this thesis, the background of singular propositions has been examined, followed by a discussion of arguments for their existence. The problems arising from accepting singular propositions in terms of modal logic and temporal logic have been touched upon. It has been investigated which contemporary ontological approaches are referenced in the effort to solve these problems, and finally, these approaches have been evaluated from the perspective of the Kalam discipline. In this framework, it has been argued that major strategies in modal metaphysics, such as possibilism, and in temporal logic, such as eternalism, bear remarkable similarities to the Muʿtazilī maʿdûm doctrine, which attributes an ontological status (thingness) to non-existent things. Accordingly, it has been contended that a method structurally similar to the approaches developed in contemporary metaphysics regarding the semantics of singular propositions can be consistently constructed within the ontological commitments of the Kalam tradition.