Immanuel Kant'ta "Ding" ve "Ich" kavramları

This thesis investigates the following questions by considering the Kantian transcendental object, which grounds inner intuition and outer appearances, as the unknown but true correlate of those representations belonging to the inner and outer senses. Is the cognition of a transcendental object possible? Is a cognition of my own Self possible? Can a transcendental object be assumed as the matter or a thinking being? Just like the soul as a transcendental subject, i.e., the I, is the transcendental object of the inner sense, the thing in itself to which I relate outer appearances as their true correlate is taken as a transcendental object. When our representations, which are related to inner and outer senses, are separated from their object, whatever is remaining is equally unknown to us regarding both senses. Firstly, the synthesis has been detailed. Later, judgments of understanding were analyzed by whether the relation thought in them requires a synthetic function. Then, the successive apprehension of space and its role in ensuring the thinking subject remains identical with itself were treated. In the conclusion part, the difficulties in the question of how outer intuition is possible in a thinking subject when the matter is taken independently of sensibility were discussed. This thesis treats the possibility of cognition with reference to the Critique of Pure Reason and within a certain frame and thus grounds on the Doctrine of Transcendental Idealism that acknowledges space and time as neither the determinations given for themselves nor the conditions of things in themselves.