Iran's alliance strategy: 1945-1975

n addition to being located in an important geopolitical and geostrategic region, Iran has attracted the attention of great powers due to its natural resources. With the end of the Second World War, the change in the international system and the formation of a bipolar structure caused the USA and the USSR to enter into a global competition, while this competition was reflected in the Gulf and Iran. Depending on the global competition and the reflection of this situation on the Gulf, threats and opportunities have emerged for Iran. In this context, developments with the neighbor states and states such as the United Kingdom that have the capacity to project power to the region due to the presence of military power and navy in the region, increased Iran's threat perception and Iranian decision makers sought support against the actors that were the source of threats. Although the study covers the period of Muhammad Reza Shah, it does not claim to explain the events that took place between 1941-1979 chronologically. Instead, it is aimed to explain Iran's alliance preferences through three case studies against the perceived threat from the Soviet Union, England and Iraq. This study will use the explanatory power of the neoclassical realist theory, which is considered as a foreign policy theory, to reveal the alliance policy that Iran has followed against the actors that it perceives as a threat. In this context, it has been revealed that the strategy followed by Iran to get rid of the threats it faces is shaped by systemic, structural and unit level variables. The main purpose of this study is to show that the policy decisions taken for Iran's security, namely the alliance strategy against the perceived threat actor, are shaped by systemic, structural and unit level variables. In order to achieve this main purpose, a multiple case study analysis was conducted in order to analyze the alliance policy that the study followed against the threat Iran perceived through different tools from three different actors at different times. The point reached as a result of the evaluation of all these events is that Iran has resorted to a balancing policy depending on its threat perception. Therefore, the result obtained and the basic assumption put forward by this study is as follows: The alliance strategy followed by Iran in the face of the threats it has faced has been shaped depending on systemic, structural and unit-level factors. Accordingly, the main policy followed was balancing. Although systemic and structural factors create opportunities and constraints for the decision maker, policies to overcome these constraints have failed.