The game theory approach to cooperation

In this study, the problems arising from the cooperation which protects legal and economical independence and their solution proposals took into consideration within the framework of game theory. Within this concept, the underlying conditions of establishment and sustainability of cooperation were searched. In this respect, to simplify the problem and to facilitate its solution, cooperation was divided into two groups: colluded (coordinated) action cooperation and joint action cooperation. To explaining colluded action cooperation, the "Prisoner's Dilemma" was used as a convenient tool in explaining why players can not cooperate. It was tried to put a solution forward to the Prisoner's Dilemma to generate successful cooperation. In this context, the situation was examined in two ways: First, playing the game iteratedly and second, returning the part of benefit one player gets to the other player for acting harmoniously. In joint action cooperation, the profit distribution rising from superadditivity was deepened on purpose. To analyze this problem, the suitability of "Cooperative Game Theory" approach was questioned. Finally, the differences between the establishment and sustainability of colluded action and joint action cooperation were displayed, and the suitability of game theory as a tool for the determination of the conditions involved was questioned. In conclusion, it was aimed to bring explanations to the differences between colluded action and joint action cooperation with respect to the problem, the solution^ sustainability, punishment, and the inspection of agreements.