From primacy of practical reason to primacy of practical philosophy in Kant

Kant identifies the fact that one and the same reason is theoretically limited but practically endowed with certain powers the enigma of critical philosophy. The doctrine of the primacy of practical reason provides the solution to this enigma. This study delves into Kant's understanding of the primacy of practical reason and its broader implications, extending to the primacy of practical philosophy. Within this framework, the premises underlying the claim that practical reason has primacy over theoretical reason, as well as the primacy of practical philosophy over theoretical philosophy, are analyzed. Although the primacy of the practical at the levels of reason and philosophy remains valid, this study seeks to show that these ideas in Kant's framework are balanced through the primacy of theoretical reason and philosophy. Thus, the central problematic of this thesis is the tension between the primacy of the theoretical and the practical. In this thesis, it has been demonstrated that there is a primacy of practical reason and philosophy, while also showing that the theoretical and practical are in a relationship of balance and complementarity, which is embodied in Kant's conception of practical-dogmatic metaphysics.