Normativity in Wittgenstein: A critique of the calculus picture

In this dissertation, I argue that Wittgenstein's both early and late writings can be read as two different critiques of the calculus conception of language and two different attempts to provide alternative accounts of looking at the normativity of language. In both of his early and late writings, he attacks the philosophical theories that aim to explain its subject matter by relying on theses and doctrines, because for him these theories rely on conceptualizing language as a calculus. In his Tractatus, his critique aims of showing the inexpressible character of general rules. He gives an immanent critique of the philosophical projects that axiomatize language. However, his mystical solution for expressing the general structure of language still relies on the idea that language operates according to calculus. In his Philosophical Investigations, he undermines the conception of language as a calculus, by crystallizing its conceptual assumptions in the primitive picture of meaning and linguistic exchange, which informs many philosophical theories. His criticism of this picture and the rule-following argument show us the implausible absurdities inherent in this picture. I argue that his practice-based conception of language and rules in Philosophical Investigations, overcome the difficulties of the calculus conception of normativity altogether by providing a new sense of linguistic necessity with his account of grammatical propositions. Lastly, I claim that his novel understanding of rules and language provides new tools for doing philosophy.